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THE PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC CHOICE:
THE CASE OF SHORT LIMITATION
PERIODSO
By KENT ROACH*
This article examines public choice as a predictor of legislative behaviour and
as a guide for statutory and constitutional interpretation. It focuses on short
limitation periods, which have often been criticized as special interest
legislation benefiting well-organized groups, such as medical doctors. The
author concludes that the economic assumptions of public choice cannot
adequately explain complexities in interest group behaviour, and that the
Canadian legislative process has the ability to advance the interests of diffuse
and unorganized groups, such as patients. The author also argues that given
the absence of normative content in public choice analysis, Canadian courts
have rightly rejected it as a guide for constitutional review or strong forms of
statutory interpretation, which ignore clear legislative purposes or words.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Public choice theory uses economic assumptions to explain and
predict the behaviour of interest groups and legislatures. 1 On the whole,
it paints a rather bleak picture of the legislative process. Interest groups
with pre-existing organizational structures and a concentrated
membership can dominate the demand for the legislative product,
because only such groups can overcome the problems of rational
individuals being unwilling to pay the costs of organizing and lobbying.
Thus, concentrated groups of producers will be able to make more
effective demands on governments than diffuse groups of consumers.
When they are not plagued by the problems created by log-rolling and
agenda setting, legislators will respond to the demands of concentrated
interest groups for benefits and be rewarded through campaign
contributions and other forms of payment. The costs of such measures
will be borne by diffuse and unorganized groups who cannot organize to
complain. In short, public choice assumes that the legislative process is a
market and one in which concentrated interest groups have a distinct
advantage.
Public choice is presently attracting much attention from legal
academics in the United States.2 Legal scholars are intrigued by public
choice, in part, because its critical portrayal of the legislative process
begs the question of what role the judiciary should play. In this paper, I
will assess public choice as a predictor of legislative behaviour and as a
guide for judicial behaviour in one Canadian context: statutory
limitation periods and, in particular, special short limitation periods.
Statutory limitation periods prevent the assertion of civil claims
deemed stale. All common law provinces in Canada have general
limitation statutes that provide set periods beyond which various civil
1 M. Olson, The Logic of CoAllectiveAction: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965); J.M. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); and D.C. Mueller, Public Choice (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1979).
2 See, generally, the collection of symposium articles in (1988) 74 Va. L Rev. 167 and
following; the "Positive Political Theory and Public Law" symposium articles in (1989) 65 Chi-Kent
L Rev. 3 and following; the "Symposium on Post-Chicago Law and Economics" articles in (1992) 80
Geo. I.J. 457 and following; and D.A. Farber & P.P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical
Introduction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). In the United Kingdom, see P.
McAuslan, "Public Law and Public Choice" (1988) 51 Mod. L Rev. 681. There has been less
interest in public choice among Canadian legal academics. The leading Canadian work is MJ.
Trebilcock et aL, The Choice of Governinglnstnument (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1982).
See also M.R. Gillen, "Countervailing Duties: Efficiency and Public Choice" (1991) 23 Ottawa L.
Rev. 1.
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claims cannot be asserted against defendants. In addition, most
provinces also have special short limitation periods applying to a subset
of claims. These periods are often provided in legislation governing
members of a profession. They have often been criticized as special
interest legislation designed to protect powerful and well-organized
groups of potential defendants, most notoriously medical doctors.3 In
addition, the plaintiffs whose claims are precluded by short limitation
periods are generally the diffuse and unorganized groups that public
choice suggests are disadvantaged in the legislative process. Thus, short
limitation periods present a context in which public choice analysis may
help to explain legislative behaviour.
The first part of this paper will outline the nature of short
limitation periods in the Canadian common law provinces. Short
limitations are found in a variety of contexts and protect a variety of
defendants, including health professionals, the media, insurance
companies, and municipalities. The second part will attempt to explain
short limitations in light of public choice theory. Focusing on short
limitation periods for medical malpractice actions, I will suggest that
there are complexities in interest group behaviour that are not easily
captured by the economic assumptions of public choice. Public choice
analysis ignores softer non-material and non-rational variables which
may motivate interest groups and runs the risk of providing non-
falsifiable and tautologous explanations for any result.
Next, I will examine the role that the judiciary has played in the
administration of short limitation periods. Courts have protected
plaintiffs in latent damage cases by delaying the running of time limits to
the point at which a wrong could reasonably have been discovered.4
Further, the Supreme Court of Canada has stated that it will strictly
interpret short limitation periods so that "any ambiguity found upon the
application of the proper principles of statutory interpretation should be
resolved in favour of the person whose right of action is being
truncated."5  In recent years, plaintiffs have also attacked short
limitation periods directly by arguing that they violate the Canadian
3 J.P.S. McLaren, "Of Doctors, Hospitals and Limitations-'The Patient's Dilemma" (1973)
11 Osgoode Hall LJ. 85; and Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan, Proposals for a New
Limitation ofActionsAct (Saskatoon: Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan, 1989) at 51.
4 Kamloops (City of) v. Nielsen, [1984] 2 S.CYL 2; Central Trust Co. v. Rafuse, [1986] 2 S.C.R.
147 (application of discoverability principles to tort actions) [hereinafter Rafiuse]; Consumers Glass
Co. v. Foundation Co. of Canada (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 385 (Ont. CA.) (application of discoverability
principles to actions based on contract); and M.(K) v. M.(H.), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6 (application of
discoverability principles to claims based on childhood incest) [hereinafter M.(K)].
5Berardnelli v. Ontario Housing Corporation (1978), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 275 at 280.
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms.6 I will address whether Canadian courts
have or should play an active role in counteracting the deficiencies
public choice claims exist in the legislative process.
In the final section, I will suggest that public choice has limited
utility in explaining the behaviour of Canadian legislatures and that,
contrary to its predictions, legislative reform of short limitations in the
interest of diffuse groups of plaintiffs is possible. Moreover, I will
suggest that a fundamental problem in public choice analysis is its lack of
explicit normative analysis. Public choice fails to explain why special
interest legislation is undesirable and it ignores the possibility that some
short limitation periods may actually serve the public interest. I will
argue that because of these deficiencies, public choice cannot justify
courts striking down short limitation periods on constitutional grounds
or modifying them through strong forms of statutory interpretation,
which ignore clear statutory purposes and words.
I. SHORT LIMITATION PERIODS
Short limitation periods, applying only to certain civil claims
against certain defendants, have long been a feature of Canadian law.
Twenty years after Confederation, anAct to Amend the MedicalAct7 was
passed in the Ontario legislature providing that:
[n]o duly registered member of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario shall
be liable for any action for negligence or malpractice, by reason of professional services
requested or rendered, unless such action be commenced within one year from the date
when in the matter complained of such professional services terminated. 8
Over the next twenty years, similar legislation, modifying a normal six-
year limitation period for negligence actions, was enacted in most
provinces through special provisions in their respective acts governing
the medical profession.9
In the years that followed, legislation has been passed to provide
short limitation periods for civil actions against other professional
6 Part I of the ConsftitionAc4 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [hereinafter Charter]. See, generally, J.B. Laskin et aL, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights
Annotated (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1993) c. 15(1):400000.
7 S.O. 1887, c. 24.
8 Ibid., s. 2, quoted in McLaren, supra note 3 at 87.
9 S.M. 1888, c. 36, s. 9; S.B.C. 1898, c. 9, s. 61; S.N.S. 1899, c. 32, s. 35; S.P.E.. 1899, c. 24, s. 22;
S.N.B. 1903, c. 118; S.A. 1906, c. 28, s. 59; S.S. 1906, c. 28, s. 55.
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groups such as dentists,'10 pharmacists, 11 optometrists, 12 and nurses1 3
Such legislation also protects hospitals. 14 In addition, short limitation
periods for claims on accident, life, fire, and automobile insurance
policies are also found in legislation governing the insurance industry.1 5
The media are protected by short notice and limitation periods for
defamation actions. 6 Short limitations also govern claims against
various public authorities, including claims against municipalities for
10 Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. L-15, s. 55(b) (one year from termination of
services); The Dental Association Act, RLS.M. 1987, c. D-30, s. 44 (two years from termination of
services); The DentalAct, S.N. 1983, c. 26, s. 32 (two years from termination of services); Limitation
of Actions Act R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 258, s. 2(1)(d) (two years from termination of services); Health
Disciplines Act R.S.O. 1990, c. HA, s. 17 (one year from discoverability); Dental Profession Act
R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. D-6, s. 11(2) (six months from termination of services); and The Dental Profession
Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. D-5, s. 51 (one year from termination of services).
11 Pharmacy Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 343, s. 60 (one year from termination of services); and
Health Disciplines Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 114, s. 17 (one year from discoverability). Note that in this
catalogue I have excluded limitation periods for regulatory offences that are often listed in texts on
limitation periods. See G. Mew, The Law of Limitations (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991) at
Appendix; and J.C. Morton, Limitation of CivilActions (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) at Appendix. My
concern is only with limitations that restrict the ability of individuals to bring civil actions.
Limitations regarding when the state can prosecute regulatory offences raise different issues.
12 Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. L-15, s. 55(f) (one year from termination of
services); The Optomety Act, S.S. 1985, c. 0-6.1, s. 50 (one year from termination of services); and
Health DisciplinesAct, P-S.O. 1990, c. H.4, s. 17 (one year from discoverability).
13 Health Disciplines Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.4, s. 17 (one year from discoverability); Limitation
of Actions Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 258, s. 2(1)(d) (two years from termination of services); and
HospitalsAct, R.S.P.E.L 1988, c. H-10, s. 13 (one year from termination of services).
14 Limitation of Actions Act, R.SA. 1980, c. L-15, s. 56 (one year after cause of action arose);
Limitation Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 236, s. 8(1) (six years from termination of services); Public
Hospitals Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-23, s. 17 (two years after termination of services); Limitation of
Actions Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 258, s. 2(1)(d) (two years from termination of services); Public
Hospitals Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.40, s. 31 (two years from termination of services); Hospitals Act,
R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. H-10, s. 13 (one year from termination of services); and The Hospitals Standards
Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. H-10, s. 15 (three months from damage).
15 These are often in the form of statutory conditions which require claims on accident and
illness policies, fire insurance policies, and motor vehicle policies to be brought within one or two
years. Life insurance claims have to be brought before the earlier of one year after presenting
evidence or six years after contingency. See generally Mew, supra note 11 at 286-87; and Morton,
supra note 11 at 116-18.
16Defamation Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. D-5, s. 14 (six months from publication); The Defamation
Act, S.N. 1983, c. 63, s. 17 (three months from knowledge); Defamation Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 122, s.
19 (six months from publication); Libel and SlanderAct, R.S.O. 1990, c. L12, s. 6 (three months
from knowledge); Defamation Act, R.S.P.E.L 1988, c. D-5, s. 15 (six months from publication); and
The Libel and Slander Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. L-14, s. 14 (six months from publication). The acts also
generally provide a notice requirement, usually within fourteen days.
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lack of repair of roads and claims against some public utilitiesj 7 As this
catalogue demonstrates, short limitations benefit a variety of
professions, industries, and public bodies and it might be thought
difficult to generalize about political behaviour in so many contexts.
Nevertheless, public choice claims to be able to explain and predict a
broad range of political behaviour through its use of economic
assumptions.1 8
The existence of short limitation periods is complicated by the
fact that most common law provinces have altered the traditional six-
year limitation period governing negligence actions, replacing it with a
two-year period.19 Thus, many limitation periods that may have
qualified as short limitations when originally enacted, no longer have the
same status. For example, of all the common law provinces with a two-
year negligence limitation period, only Alberta and Saskatchewan now
have shorter limitation periods of one year to bring malpractice claims
against doctors2 0
The situation is further complicated because courts will now
interpret limitation periods subject to discoverability principles, unless
there are clear words that displace such an interpretation. The one-year
limitation for malpractice actions against doctors in Alberta and
Saskatchewan is made shorter in cases of latent injury by the fact that
the legislation specifies that time starts to run from the termination of
medical services. Ontario's Health Disciplines Act contains a one-year
limitation period for medical malpractice claims which is especially
1 7 The Public Officers Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. P230, s. 21(1) (two years after act); Constables'
Protection Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 88, s. 5 (six months); The Justices and Other Public Authorities
(Protection) Act, R.S.N. 1970, c. 189, s. 19(c) (six months); Public Authorities Protection Act, R.S.O.
1990, c. P.38, s. 7 (six months); The Public Officers' Protection Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-40, s. 2(1)(a)
(one year); Public Utilities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.52, s. 33 (six months); and MunicipalAct, R.S.O.
1990, c. M.45, s. 284(2) (three months).
18 See, generally, Trebilcock et aL, supra note 2 (applying public choice to various contexts,
including public inquiries, taxation, public enterprise, and regulation).
19 Limitation ofActionsAct, R.SA. 1980, c. L-1S, s. 51; LimitationAct, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 236, s.
3(1); The Limitation of Action Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. L150, s. 2; Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.N.B.
1973, c. L-8, s. 4; Statute of Limitations, R.S.P.E.L 1988, c. S-7, s. 2(1); and The Limitation ofActions
Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. L-15, s. 3(1)(d). In contrast, only British Columbia has reduced the traditional
six-year limitation for contractual actions to two years.
2 0 Limitation ofActions Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. L-15, s. 55; and The Medical Profesron Act, R.S.S.
1978, c. M-10, s. 72. Ontario, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland have retained the six-year limitation
on negligence actions, but have special limitations of one year, two years, and two years,
respectively, for malpractice claims against doctors. See Health Disciplines Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.4,
s. 17; Limitation ofActionsAct, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 258, s. 2(1)(d); and The MedicalAct, S.N. 1974, c.
119, s. 25(a).
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short, given that ordinary negligence actions are still governed by a six-
year limitation period in that province. Nevertheless, Ontario amended
its malpractice limitation in 1974, so that the limitation runs from the
time the plaintiff should have known the facts upon which the action is
based, thus incorporating discoverability principles in a statutory form
before they were imposed by the courts21 New Brunswick is unique in
giving the plaintiff the longer of a two-year period from the date of
termination of medical services or one year from knowledge of the
facts? 2 It is important to understand that whether any particular
limitation period qualifies as short depends upon what the limitation
would be in the province, absent the special limitation, and whether it
precludes judicial application of discoverability principles.
The various provincial law reform commissions that have
examined limitation periods have invariably criticized short limitations
as creating confusion and unfairness? 3 A 1989 report by the Law
Reform Commission of Saskatchewan concluded that "[p]erhaps the
single greatest problem plaguing Saskatchewan limitation law is the
proliferation of special limitation periods."24 Law reform commissions
have generally recommended the wholesale repeal of special limitation
periods and the incorporation of all limitations affecting civil claims into
one comprehensive statute. They have stressed fairness to the plaintiff
and the desirability, for both the public and lawyers, of having simple
uniform limitation periods. At the same time, the commissions
suggested that special limitations were developed, in part, because of the
inappropriateness of the traditional six-year period for negligence
actions25 With the enactment of a standard two-year limitation for
negligence actions, they argue that special limitations of less than two
years are no longer justified.
21 Health Disciplines Ac4 R.S.O. 1990, c. H.4, s. 17. British Columbia also incorporated
discoverability principles in its legislative reforms. See LimitationsAct, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 236, s. 6(3).
22 MedicalAct, S.N.B. 1981, c. 87, s. 67.
23 See, for example, Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Limitation of Actions
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1969) c. 5; Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Report on
Limitations: Part lI-General (Victoria: Queen's Printer, 1974) c. 7; Law Reform Commission of
Saskatchewan, supra note 3, c. 5; and Newfoundland Law Reform Commission, Working Paper on
Limitation ofActions (St. John's: Newfoundland Law Reform Commission, 1985) Q 9.
24 Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan, supra note 3 at 51.
2 5 Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 23 at 35.
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m. PUBLIC CHOICE EXPLANATIONS OF SHORT LIMITATION
PERIODS
Like any other social science, public choice has different schools
with different orientations.2 6 For our purpose, the relevant insights of
public choice come from its understanding of the interest group, the
demands created by interest groups for legislative benefits, and the
supply provided by legislatures. This form of public choice owes much
to the work of Mancur Olson on groups and the provision of public
goods.27 Olson applies the economic assumption of self-interested
behaviour to the behaviour of individuals and groups. Although many
individuals could benefit from organizing together with other individuals
with similar interests to lobby politicians, the costs of organization are
significant. It is never in the interest of any particular individual to pay
the costs of organizing and lobbying. Thus potential lobbies "would get
no assistance from ... rational, self-interested individuals."2 8  The
exception, however, is in the case of small groups, in which individuals
receive enough concentrated benefits to justify the costs of organization.
Benefits are more diffuse in larger groups and the organization costs
greater. As Olson concludes, "the larger the group, the less it will
further its common interests. ' 29 Thus, concentrated groups of producers
can be expected to produce more effective demands for governmental
favours than larger, more diffuse groups of consumers. Large dispersed
groups will not organize or act to further their common interests and
they will suffer at the hands of smaller groups which can organize and
lobby20
Olson developed a more sophisticated "by-product" or "special
interest" theory of demand for government favours based on the
observation that some groups are already organized for purposes other
than lobbying governments. Thus, the organization costs of these groups
are substantially reduced. The problem of individual self-interest in the
formation of the group has been overcome and resources can be devoted
to lobbying for the group's interests. Citing the American Medical
Association as a prime example, Olson noted "[t]he large and powerful
26 See, generally, Mueller, supra note 1; and N. Gunningham "Public Choice: The Economic
Analysis of Public Law" (1992) 21 Fed. L Rev. 117.
2 7 See Olson, supra note 1.
28 1bizd at 11.
29 Aid. at36.
3 0 /ba at 165-67.
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economic lobbies are in fact the by-products of organizations that obtain
their strength and support because they perform some function in
addition to lobbying for collective goods."31 Doctors, who may have to
form an organization as part of a state-mandated licensing body, and
who, in any event, have an interest in organizing in order to provide
services such as education and insurance, would promise to be a
particularly powerful and effective lobby. In comparison, the
organization costs of patients (who are prospective malpractice
plaintiffs) would be formidable, because they are a diffuse group with no
pre-existing organizational structure.
On the supply side, public choice theorists have also applied the
assumptions of economics to predict the behaviour of legislatures faced
with strong demands from small and organized groups, and weak or non-
existent demands from larger groups. The ability to reward organized
groups is thought to increase the likelihood, either directly or indirectly,
of politicians being re-elected. Landes and Posner posit a "Chicago-
style" market for the legislative process:
[l]egislation is supplied to groups or coalitions that outbid rival seekers of favorable
legislation. The price that the winning group bids is determined both by the value of
legislative protection to the group's members and the group's ability to overcome the
free-rider problems that plague coalitions. Payment takes the form of campaign
contributions, votes, implicit promises of future favors, and sometimes outright bribes. In
short, legislation is "sold" by the legislature and "bought" by the beneficiaries of the
legislation.
32
Whatever the actual mechanism of exchange, public choice suggests that
public initiatives, which redistribute wealth to concentrated interest
groups by imposing costs on diffuse groups, can and will be
undertaken.3
3
Objections to such redistributive measures must overcome the
organizational obstacles that produced the differential demands in the
first place, as well as any information costs. For consumer or other
diffuse groups to complain, they must know that they are being hurt, but
many statutes, including short limitations, are not highly visible. Even if
diffuse groups know that they are being hurt, they must still organize,
and they cannot organize easily, because they are diffuse. Even if this
vicious circle could be broken by diffuse interests having their interests
31/bi at 132.
32 "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective" (1975) 18 J. of Law & Econ.
875 at 877.
33 Trebilcock et aL, supra note 2 at 5.
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represented,34 well-organized groups will continue to be able to lobby
against the repeal of their benefits. By making use of procedural
imperfections and inertia in the legislative process, well-organized
groups may be able to block the repeal of the benefits they enjoy.
Although the application of economic concepts to political
behaviour was novel, the conclusions reached by Olson and others were
not. The dominance of special interests in government has long been a
concern of political scientists, as well as an inspiration for populist
politics. Olson himself noted:
[t]he greater degree of organization and activity of small groups is not difficult to
illustrate; the late V.O. Key argued in his standard textbook that "the lobbyists for
electrical utilities, for example, are eternally on the job; the lobbyists for the consumers of
this monopolistic service are ordinarily conspicuous by their absence." 35
A public choice understanding of interest group domination of the
legislative process accords with much conventional, but pessimistic,
wisdom about the dominance of special interest in politics.
The conclusions of several law reform commissions are
remarkably consistent with the insights of public choice theory. In its
1969 report, the Ontario Law Reform Commission observed that most
of the special limitation periods were "enacted to protect the interests of
some special group, such as municipal corporations, hospitals, doctors,
dentists and insurance companies."36 The Law Reform Commission of
British Columbia concluded "many of these special limitation periods
appear only to serve the special interests of special professions or other
bodies."37 The Saskatchewan Law Reform Commission, perhaps
influenced by prairie populism, was the most harsh:
[s]pecial limitations provisions appear to throw a "protective cloak" around many of the
professions. This perception is extremely damaging, as it suggests a conspiracy between
lawmakers and powerful lobby groups at the expense of the public.3 8
These bodies did not accept that short limitations are justified in the
public interest by the needs for certainty and repose, for litigation to be
34 For example, organized groups of personal injury lawyers who represent patients may have
an incentive to lobby against short limitations. Likewise, private and public bodies who insure
potential plaintiffs may have an incentive to lobby against short limitations. On the other hand,
insurers of potential defendants, such as doctors and hospitals, would have an incentive to lobby for
short limitations.
3 5 Olson, supra note 1 at 128.
3 6 Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 23 at 75.
3 7 Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, supra note 23 at 118.
3 8 Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan, supra note 3 at 52.
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based on fresh evidence, and for plaintiffs to assert their rights in a
diligent fashion,3 9
Despite the intuitive appeal that public choice has in explaining
short limitation periods, care must be taken not to ignore complexities in
interest group and legislative behaviour that are not easily captured in
public choice analysis. The following will illustrate some shortcomings in
public choice analysis as it is applied to short limitation periods.
Public choice purports to apply the scientific method to the study
of politics and in science it is important to examine the data, both to
determine when it accords with a hypothesis, and when it does not.
Short limitation periods do not always benefit the organized producer
and professional groups that Olson takes as the model of those who will
be able to secure favours from the legislature. For example, lawyers
would seem to be a perfect example of a group that, because of their
pre-existing, legislatively mandated organizational structure, should be
able to lobby for short limitation periods, that would decrease their
litigation and insurance costs. Yet, with the exception of
Newfoundland,4 no Canadian province provides such limitation periods
for negligence actions against lawyers. Although the reasons why
lawyers have not obtained such benefits from the legislature are quite
speculative, 41 the absence of short limitation periods to protect this well-
organized group is a significant false negative.
Short limitation periods often protect governmental bodies,
which are not the concentrated interest groups that Olson's theory
predicts will obtain benefits from the legislature. Here, public choice
may still have explanatory and predictive power. Although
governmental bodies, such as municipalities and public utilities, may not
be bound by the same economic pressures as corporations and
professions, they may be able to make use of pre-existing organizational
39 On the purposes of statute of limitations, see M.(K) supra note 4 at 29-30; and Stoddard v.
Watson, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1069 (sub non. Murphy v. Welsh) [hereinafter Stoddard].
40 Law Society Act 1977, S.N. 1977, c. 77, s. 95 (period of lesser of four years from termination
of services or two years from discovery as compared to normal six-year limitation for negligence
actions). Note that architects and accountants, who are also organized professional groups, likewise
receive almost no special protection. See Mew, supra note 11 at 119-27.
41 It is possible that the nature of much high-risk legal work was not actionable within
traditional limitation periods that run from the date of the legal service being rendered; Schwebel v.
Telekes (1967), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 470 (Ont. C.A.). Now, however, discoverability principles would
apply. See Raftuse, supra note 4 (applying discoverability principles to legal defects in a mortgage).
It is also possible that the unpopularity of lawyers and media attention raise the costs for legislators
to enact short limitations to benefit lawyers. This, however, would complicate public choice analysis
by suggesting that the media and publicity can frustrate the will of well-organized interests.
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structures and resources to pursue their own self-interests. It may be
rational for organized groups of municipalities and utilities to lobby for
shorter limitation periods to limit successful claims. Successful claims
may come out of revenues and, at some margin, force increases in
taxation or reductions in expenditures which again, at an indeterminate
margin, can threaten re-election prospects and bureaucratic ambitions.42
It should not be forgotten, however, that liability awards and litigation
costs in the public sector will be absorbed into a "bureaucratic black
box" with its own particular, and sometimes perverse, incentives. 43 If
municipalities and other public bodies were not protected by short
limitation periods, it is possible that the costs of increased litigation
could be absorbed or passed on without adverse consequences to
incumbents.
Public choice relies on the economic assumption that individuals
and interest groups will pursue their material self-interest. It has been
argued that the assumption that individuals and groups will rationally
pursue their material self-interest is the best predictor of human
behaviour, even if it does not hold true in all cases.44 This may be so, but
in the context of short limitations, it is not clear that the interest groups
that benefit from them are acting in a rational and materialistic manner.
To take the oldest, most notable example: have medical doctors acted
rationally in their material interest in securing short limitation periods
and lobbying against their reform? Short limitation periods prevent
some subset of all malpractice claims from being successfully litigated,
and by eliminating some litigation and damage award costs this reduces
some costs for some doctors. 45 In the modem context, however, these
cost reductions are mediated through collective insurance schemes.
Despite the central importance that material incentives have in public
choice theory, there is some evidence that doctors may be interested in
short limitations for reasons that are not primarily material.
Short limitations have an important repose function, which
enables doctors to know that a year or two after they have performed a
42 For an application of public choice assumptions to the behaviour of various governmental
bodies, see Trebilcock et aL, supra note 2.
43 P.L Schuck, Suing Government (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983) at 123-24.
44 Trebilcock et aL, supra note 2 at 18-19.
45 Note that "doctors" may not be the homogenous group that Olson and other interest group
theorists presume and this will complicate their analysis. Doctors in different fields may have
different incentives to obtain short limitations, particularly if insurance is sold on the basis of their
speciality. Thus obstetricians, who are frequently sued, may be more interested in lobbying to
obtain short limitations than family practitioners.
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medical intervention, they will not face public challenges to their work
through litigation. This sense of repose has economic dimensions, but it
primarily promotes a psychological sense of well-being by diminishing
insecurity and anxiety. A recent study based on extensive consultation
with the medical profession has concluded that Canadian doctors relate
to the threat of litigation primarily in a psychological as opposed to an
economic sense.46 In calculating the value of short limitation periods to
doctors, it may be crucial to include not only the financial advantages of
precluding some claims, but also the less tangible psychological value of
repose.47
As the calculus of human motivation becomes more complex,
however, it becomes much more difficult to predict behaviour.
Particular calculations of psychological value may be difficult to
disprove. For example, it can be posited that if a short limitation period
does not protect the material interests of the medical profession, then it
must serve their psychological interest. Such a conclusion verges on a
non-falsifiable tautology and undermines the utility of public choice as a
predictive and explanatory tool. On the other hand, to restrict analysis
to material benefits may fail to capture important motivations for human
behaviour.
The problem of interest group motivation is further complicated
by the possibility that a group will not correctly perceive its own
interests, however defined. Again, short limitations for medical
malpractice claims provide an interesting example. It is not clear that
short limitations actually promote either the psychological or economic
self-interest of doctors. A recent study has reported that short limitation
periods have the effect of encouraging premature filing of civil claims,
46 The Prichard Interprovincial Committee concluded that "the most significant negative
effects of civil liability claims on physicians have been in the development of symptoms of stress,
anxiety and anger and the resulting diminution in their satisfaction from the practice of medicine."
Federal/Provincial/Territorial Review on Liability and Compensation Issues in Health Care,
Liability and Compensation in Health Care (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) (Chair:
J.R.S. Prichard) at 19. The repose function of limitation periods has traditionally been recognized
to have a psychological, as well as an economic, dimension. See G.D. Watson, "Amendment of
Proceedings after Limitation Periods" (1975) 53 Can. Bar Rev. 237 at 272.
47 Other groups may be motivated by other intangible concerns. For example, some
professions may consider that a short limitation enacted for their benefit in special legislation helps
to confer official recognition and prestige on their profession. On the symbolic value of legislation
and other official policies, see M. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1964).
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which are later abandoned or settled.4 Even if doctors think that short
limitation periods limit successful claims and encourage repose, they
may be wrong. Short limitation periods may actually encourage
premature litigation that imposes both psychological and economic costs
on doctors. The economic assumptions about human behaviour that
public choice employs are complicated both by the importance of less
tangible, non-material incentives and the possibility of miscalculation
and non-rational behaviour. If public choice humanizes its calculus by
including these factors, however, it runs the risk of undercutting its
predictive utility, not to mention its self-image as a scientific discipline.
Another limitation of public choice analysis is that it tends to
explain legislative and interest group behaviour in static terms which
focus on the enactment of statutes, while forgetting that the interests
and behaviour of groups change over time 49 As examined in the last
section, the status of a limitation period as "short" depends not just on
the motivations behind its enactment, but on subsequent legal
developments. One important legal development has been adjustments
to the baseline limitation period, which has been lowered from six to two
years for negligence actions in most common law provinces. Doctors,
who successfully lobbied for a one-year limitation period that was five
years shorter than the average when it was enacted, have seen their
comparative advantage decreased, as the standard limitation for
negligence actions was lowered to two years. They might welcome this
reform, because it makes their limitations less conspicuous and
vulnerable to reform. On the other hand, they might regret the loss of
their comparative advantage for symbolic reasons. In any event, reform
of the baseline limitation periods suggests that limitation periods of two
years or more, that were originally enacted as short limitations to benefit
interest groups, may now be justified for general reasons, such as the
increased availability of legal services and the application of
discoverability principles to claims based on latent injuries.
Another important development has been the inclination of
courts in the last decade to extend limitation periods by interpreting
them subject to discoverability principles. Such principles, when applied
4 8 Prichard, supranote 46 at 20. A study included in the appendix of that report concluded
that the incidence of premature filing of claims means that short limitation periods "increase the
frequency of claims and reduce the quality of claims, both being disadvantageous developments
from the perspectives of the health care providers" [emphasis added]. Prichard, bid., appendix A:
Health Care Liability and Compensation Review "Working Paper" at 197 [hereinafter Prichard,
Appendix A].
49 See, generally, R. Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1982) at 101 and following.
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to special limitation periods, can significantly reduce the value of the
limitation to defendants, by exposing them to indefinite periods of
liability. This development erodes both the financial and psychological
value of short limitation periods, by exposing defendants to claims for
latent harms. Public choice recognizes that the independent judiciary
can upset the advantages organized groups attain in the legislative
arena s0 It would predict, however, that the organized groups harmed by
the judiciary would respond to this development by lobbying for
statutory amendments to .displace discoverability principles and have the
limitation run from the time of the contractual breach or negligence. As
will be discussed later, there has been some movement in this
direction,51 but it has been far from universal.
Another complication lies in the variation in short limitations
among provinces and among different professional groups. Public
choice explanations of these variations are indeterminate and can justify
almost any scenario. For example, it could be argued that the more
populous provinces face stronger demands for short limitations, because
their interest groups have more developed organizational structures and
economies of scale. On the other hand, it could be argued that interest
groups have disproportionate influence in the less populous provinces,
because of their smaller numbers and tighter organizational structures. 52
Similar ambiguities are encountered in explaining differences between
the treatment of different groups. Older professions, such as doctors,
could have better developed organizations and more lobbying power
than newer professions, such as chiropractors. On the other hand,
newer professions could have tighter organizational structures as they
struggle for recognition and thus be in a better position to lobby
governments for short limitation periods. The problem is not that public
choice theory cannot be made to fit the facts, but that it can offer
speculative explanations for any set of facts.
Despite the shortcomings identified above, public choice does
provide some plausible explanations for the existence of short limitation
periods. Interest groups and governmental bodies that are already
50 Landes & Posner, supra note 32.
51 Limitation Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 236, s. 8(1) (six-year ultimate limitation period for
malpractice claims against doctors and hospitals, compared to standard thirty-year ultimate
limitation period, which also applies regardless of discoverability). For criticisms of this provision
and a proposal for a standard ten-year ultimate limitation period see Law Reform Commission of
British Columbia, Report on the Ultimate Limitation Period: Limitation Ac Section 8 (Victoria:
Queen's Printer, 1990) [hereinafter B.C. Report].
52 On interprovincial differences in another context, see RJ. Daniels, "Should Provinces
Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market" (1991) 36 McGill LJ. 130.
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organized are in a good position to lobby the legislature for benefits. At
the same time, the legislature is in a position to respond to these
concentrated demands and impose the costs of short limitations on
unorganized and diffuse groups of potential plaintiffs. Many
conventional accounts of short limitation periods accord with public
choice theory by depicting them as special interest legislation. Although
public choice does have some power to explain short limitations, in many
instances, it will be important to factor in less tangible motivations, the
possibility of error, and the dynamic nature of group interests. Doing so,
however, risks making public choice an indeterminate and tautologous
way of explaining interest group and legislative behaviour.
IV. JUDICIAL REFORM OF SHORT LIMITATION PERIODS
Public choice promotes a distrust of the legislative process and
its vulnerability to capture by organized interests. Increasingly, legal
theorists influenced by public choice are looking to the independent
judiciary and the vehicles of constitutional review and statutory
interpretation as a restraint on the legislative process. Have Canadian
courts attempted to correct the deficiencies that public choice claims
exist in the legislative process? Should they?
A. Constitutional Review
Recall that public choice theorists believe that small, well-
organized groups will dominate the demands for legislation and that
legislators will systematically ignore the interests of unorganized and
diffuse interests. As Judge Abner Mikva has noted, the insights of public
choice require
[jiudges to be judicial activists without even the traditional justification for judicial
activism-that judges sometimes must protect minorities from the excesses of
majoritarianism. The public choice theorists would turn this rationale on its head and
have judges protect the majority from the minorities who supposedly have expropriated
the majority institutions for private ends.5 3
What Judge Mikva identifies as "the traditional justification for judicial
activism" is associated in the United States with strict scrutiny of laws
that affect "discrete and insular minorities," a phrase that was used in
53 AJt. Mlkva, "Foreword: Public Choice Symposium" (1988) 74 Va. L Rev. 167 at 170.
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the famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co.5 4 In that
case, the United States Supreme Court articulated an approach to
judicial review that helped put an end to the type of judicial review
exemplified by its Lochner v. New York55 decision that invalidated
maximum hour laws for bakers. Bruce Ackerman has suggested that the
Carolene Products justification for judicial review is hopelessly out of
date, in large part because of the development of public choice theory5 6
He urges a repudiation of "the bad political science that allows us to
ignore those citizens who have the most serious complaints: the
anonymous and diffuse victims of poverty and sexual discrimination who
find it most difficult to protect their fundamental interests through
political organization."5 7 Although Ackerman sees women, the poor,
and gays and lesbians as the groups most in need of protection in
American society,58 public choice theory predicts that those who are
vulnerable in the legislative process may not share those groups' history
of suffering prejudice, or their tenuous organizational base. Public
choice would suggest that courts should protect all large and
unorganized groups because of their vulnerability in a political process
dominated by organized interests.
Judges who acted on public choice premises would embark on a
searching form of judicial review that would bear some resemblance to
the role that American courts played in the Lochner era. They would be
suspicious of the legislative process and the ability of well-organized
groups to use this form of judicial review to impose costs on unorganized
54 304 U.S. 144 at 152, note 4 (1938) [hereinafter CaroleneProducts].
55 198 U.S. 45 at 56-57 (1905) [hereinafter Lochner]. The Lochner Court posed the question
of whether the legislation was "a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power of
the state" and, anticipating public choice, was suspicious that the law only applied to bakers. Justice
Peckham suggested "[t]here is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and
capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, or that they are not able to assert their rights
and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the state[.]"
5 6 "Beyond Carotene Products" (1985) 98 Harv. L Rev. 713.
5 7 1bid. at 745.
5 8 Although Ackerman appeals to public choice theory, which is best known for stressing the
vulnerability of groups such as consumers, he selects for protection groups that have historically
suffered prejudice and disadvantage. Interestingly, in the Canadian context, the groups he suggests
that are vulnerable but not protected under Carolene Products, iupra note 54, would probably be
protected under the broad form of anti-majoritarian judicial review contemplated underAndrews v.
Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at 152-53. For example, women are specifically
protected as an enumerated group, and the poor and homosexuals have a good chance of being
recognized as analogous groups who are vulnerable in the broader social, legal, and political
context. Andrews was, in part, inspired by Carotene Products, but recognized the need for its test to
be adapted to the modem Canadian context and changing political and social conditions.
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interests. This would require them to scrutinize all legislation that made
any legal distinctions in the treatment of similarly-situated individuals.
They would strike down distinctions that benefit organized interests, but
are "arbitrary" and "irrational" to legitimate governmental purposes. In
addition, the right of access to courts would be taken seriously, because
courts as independent bodies have a key role to play in protecting
individuals from a legislative process which can easily be dominated by
well-organized interests.
In both Canada and the United States plaintiffs have challenged
short limitation periods as infringing their rights to equal protection of
the law and unfairly denying them access to the courts. Some American
courts, deciding cases under their state constitutions, have accepted
public choice premises as justification for invalidating short limitation
periods. 59 For example, the Arizona Supreme Court in Kenyon v.
Hammer60 rejected arguments that a three-year ultimate limitation
period for medical malpractice suits was justified by a malpractice
insurance crisis and stated:
[t]he state has neither a compelling nor legitimate interest in providing economic relief to
one segment of society by depriving those who have been wronged of access to, and
remedy by, the judicial system. If such a hypothesis were once approved, any profession,
business or industry experiencing difficulty could be made the beneficiary of special
legislation designed to ameliorate its economic adversity by limiting access to the courts
by those whom they have damaged. Under such a system, our constitutional guarantees
would be gradually eroded, until this state became no more than a playground for the
privileged and influential. 61
The Court stressed the private interests of doctors in the limitation
period, and dismissed the possibility that the public might benefit if the
limitation period increased the availability and affordability of medical
59 See, generally, F.E. McGovern, "The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product
Liability Statutes of Repose" (1981) 30 Am. U.L. Rev. 579; CJ. Trombetta, "The
Unconstitutionality of Medical Malpractice Statutes of Repose: Judicial Conscience Versus
Legislative Will" (1989) 34 Villanova L Rev. 397; and J.L Hicks, "The Constitutionality of Statutes
of Repose: Federalism Reigns" (1985) 38 Vand. L Rev. 627. For an application of public choice
concepts to these questions, see HA. Learner, "Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation
Schemes: A Constitutional 'Quid Pro Quo' Analysis to Safeguard Individual iberties" (1981) 18
Harv. J. on Legisl. 143.
60 688 P.2d 961 (Ariz. 1984) [hereinafter Kenyon].
61 1bW at 976. See also Farey v. Engelken, 740 P.2d 1058 at 1064 (Kan. 1987) (strict scrutiny
justified because of medical malpractice victims' "lack of group cohesiveness and political
disorganization").
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services. Kenyon is extreme in its suspicion of the legislative process62
and it represents a form of judicial review that shows little or no
deference to the legislature.
On the other hand, an equal number of states have upheld
medical malpractice statutes of repose. Following more traditional
patterns of deference to legislative objectives, they have accepted a
public interest in responding to rising insurance premiums. They thus
reject the conclusion that such legislation is illegitimately aimed at
furthering only the private interests of defendants. Moreover, they apply
more deferential standards in determining if legislation rationally and
effectively pursues valid governmental objectives.6 3
In Canada, most plaintiffs that have challenged short limitation
periods as infringing their rights under ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter have
lost. Courts have held that either their constitutional rights have not
been violated or that the government is justified in providing special
limitations.
The Canadian case that comes closest to Kenyon is the decision
of Smith J. of the Ontario High Court in Streng v. Township of
Winchester.64 In a decision later overruled by the Ontario Court of
Appeal,65 Smith J. held that a three-month limitation period under the
Municipal Act for suits against municipalities for non-repair of roads
violated s. 15 of the Charter. He was faced with compelling facts. The
plaintiff suffered serious injuries in a car accident and was hospitalized
for seven months. Upon his release, the plaintiff promptly commenced
an action against the municipality. Smith J. relied on the Ontario Law
Reform Commission's criticisms of short limitations as "protect[ing] the
interests of some special group, such as municipal corporations,
hospitals, doctors, dentists, and insurance companies" 66 and held that
"the consideration of 'the kind of defendant being sued' is totally
extraneous to those individuals exercising the right or claiming access to
62 Public choice theory has been criticized as cynical and corrosive of public spirit. See,
generally, S. Kelman, "Public Choice and Public Spirit" (1987) 87 Pub. Interest 80; and M. Kelman,
"On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and 'Empirical' Practice of the Public
Choice Movement" (1988) 74 Va. L Rev. 199.
63 Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984); and Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d
405 (8th Cir. 1982).
64 (1986), 56 O.R. (2d) 649 (LCJ.) [hereinafter Streng]. See also Toronto Thnsit Commiron
v. Mississauga (City) (1987), 50 M.V.R. 145 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), reaching the same results and relying on
Streng.
65 Colangelo v. Mississauga (City) (1988), 66 O.R. (2d) 29 (Ont. CA).
66 Strenmg supra note 64 at 654-55.
1993]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the courts." 67 Section 15 of the Charter was interpreted to preclude "all
irrelevant or unreasonable classifications" in limiting "the right to sue."
In the majority of similar cases, however, the three-month
limitation period for claims against a municipality for not keeping a road
in repair was upheld under s. 15 of the Charter. Some cases were
decided on the tautologous grounds that there was no discrimination
because the plaintiff was "treated in the same manner as any other
person who has a claim against a municipality for failure to maintain a
public street in a reasonable state of repair." 68 Other cases were decided
on the grounds that the government should not be compared to
individuals under s. 15 of the Charter.69 This latter line of reasoning has
now been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in another
context.70 Canadian courts have accepted the need for governmental
bodies to receive special and preferential treatment under statutes of
limitations.
The leading case upholding the three-month limitation period
for suits against municipalities for non-repair of roads is the Ontario
Court of Appeal's decision in Colangelo v. Mississauga.71 At the time,
the Court of Appeal interpreted s. 15 to require the similar treatment of
classes of persons that are similarly situated in relation to the purposes
of the impugned law. Applying the similarly situated test, Morden J.A.
concluded that those who sue a municipality with respect to accidents on
the highways are not similarly situated to those who sue private owners
of land. He traced the history of common law immunity of
municipalities for want of repair of highways and stressed their unique
6 7 1b1d, at 657.
6 8 Meldrum v. Saskatoon (City of) (1985), 46 Sask. R. 239 at 240 (Q.B.). See also Sheets v.
Burlington (City of) (1987), 14 C.P.C. (2d) 109 at 113 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), where Clarke D.CJ. found
that "[e]very plaintiff who sues a municipality for personal injuries in similar circumstances is
subject to the identical limitation period;" and Teller v. Sunshine Coast (Regional District) (1988), 27
B.C.L.R. (2d) 73 at 81 (S.C.), where Hinds J. found that "[a]ll persons who seek to sue a
municipality are faced with the same statutorily imposed limitation."
6 9 Kurolak v. Saskatchewan (Highways & Transportation) (1986), 28 D.L.R. (4th) 273 at 275
(Sask. Q.B.); andMund v. Medicine Hat (1985), 67 A.R. 11 at 13 (Q.B.). Here the court found that
"[t]he word 'individual' in s. 15(1) does not include corporations and in particular, municipal
corporations. It relates only to human beings."
70 Rudolf Wolff& Co. v. Canada, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 695 at 701, where the court found that "the
Crown is simply not an individual with whom a comparison can be made to determine whether a s.
15(1) violation has occurred." The Court also indicated that those adversely affected by the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court to hear claims against the federal Crown, were not
disadvantaged groups in Canadian society.
71 Supra note 65 [hereinafter Colangelo].
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exposure to potential liability claims.72 Unlike Smith J. in Streng, the
Court of Appeal accepted the legitimacy of special treatment of
municipalities as compared to other defendants.
The Court of Appeal in Colangelo did, however, hold that a
provision barring snow and ice claims if notice was not given within
seven days violated s. 15 by discriminating against snow and ice
claimants who were similarly situated to those bringing other claims
against the municipality. Under the impugned provision, other
claimants against a municipality could proceed with a civil suit despite
failure to give notice within seven days if, the court determined that the
municipality "was not prejudiced ... and that to bar the action would be
an injustice[.]" 73 Although the Court of Appeal recognized the
legitimacy of giving municipalities special treatment as compared to
other land owners, it did not accept the legislative claim that snow and
ice claims should be treated more harshly than other claims against the
municipality arising from the care of highways.
Even the limited potential of Charter invalidation of short
limitation or notice periods available under Colangelo was curtailed after
the Supreme Court of Canada emphatically rejected the similarly
situated test in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia.74 In that
case, the Court held that a plaintiff must not only demonstrate unequal
legal treatment, but that such treatment would result in discrimination
on the enumerated grounds of race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age, and mental and physical disability or analogous
grounds. This decision restricted the ambit of s. 15 litigation, in part out
of a concern that the similarly-situated test invited courts to engage in a
Lochner-like review of all legal distinctions. 75 Andrews was also based on
7 2 Colangelo, ibid. at 38-40. See also Rosati v. Niagara Falls (City of) (1987), 60 O.R. (2d) 474
at 478 (Dist. Ct.).
7 3 MunicipalAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 302, s. 284(6). See also Suche v. The Queen (1987), 37 D.1,.R
(4th) 474 at 484 (F.C.T.D.), aff'd (1988), 54 D.L.R. (4th) 384 (Fed. C.A.), which struck down a
similar provision under the federal Crown LiabilityAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50, as violating equality
before the law under the Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44. McNair . concluded that the
distinction between claimants against the Crown, in general, and those injured by snow and ice was
"arbitrary and capricious and so unfairly discriminatory as to violate s. 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of
Rights ... [T]he purpose of the notice of claim provision of the Act is to give the Crown an early
opportunity of investigating the circumstances under which an injury occurred and for which a claim
will likely be made. That purpose can still be achieved without having to absolutely bar the
proceedings in the case of snow or ice injuries."
74 Supra note 58 [hereinafterAndrews].
75 Before Andrews, ibid., various forms of economic regulation such as the licensing of
medicines and liquor sales, the regulation of the colour of margarine, fish catches, and milk
production were all challenged as infringing the s. 15 equality rights of individuals and corporations.
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the view that the purpose of equality rights was to protect groups
disadvantaged in the larger political, social, and legal context; not every
individual treated more harshly by a law.76
In a case decided shortly after theAndrews decision, the Ontario
Court of Appeal held that a six-month limitation period for actions done
pursuant to statutory or other public duties77 did not violate s. 15 of the
Charter. In that case, the plaintiff brought suit eight months after a
beating by other inmates in a jail, alleging that the Crown had
negligently failed to provide a sufficient number of properly trained
prison guards to ensure the safety of inmates. Morden J.A. stated that if
the plaintiff's equality rights were violated by the short limitation period,
it did not "involve discrimination, that is a distinction based upon a
ground enumerated in s. 15(1) or an analogous ground."78 Blair J.A.
elaborated:
[p]laintiffs affected by s. 11(1) of the Act are a disparate and heterogenous group linked
together only by the fact that they are victims of alleged wrongs committed by persons in
the execution of public duty or authority. The books are full of examples including
persons injured by police officers, ambulance drivers, school janitors, snow-plough
operators, hydro line repair staff and employees of the Toronto Harbour Commission....
These plaintiffs and the appellant are not linked by any personal characteristics relating
to them as individuals or members of a group. It cannot be said that s. 11(1) of the Act
discriminates against the appellant on grounds which are analogous to those enumerated
in s. 15(1) and he is, therefore, not entitled to invoke the protection of the Charter
against the special limitation periods prescribed in the Act. 79
On the pre-Andrews law, see, generally, G. Brodsky & S. Day, Canadian Charter quay Rights for
Women: One Step Forward or Two Steps Back (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on Status of
Women, 1989); C.L Smith, "Judicial Interpretation of Equality Rights under the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms: Some Clear and Present Dangers" (1988) 23 U.B.C.L. Rev. 65; and M.D.
Lepofsky & H. Schwartz, "Case Comment" (1988) 67 Can. Bar Rev. 115.
InAndrews, ibid. at 194, La Forest J. addressed these concerns directly and stated:
I am convinced that it was never intended in enacting s. 15 that it become a tool for the
wholesale subjection to judicial scrutiny of variegated legislative choices in no way
infringing on values fundamental to a free and democratic society. Like my colleague, I
am not prepared to accept that all legislative classifications must be supportable before
the courts. Much economic and social policy-making is simply beyond the institutional
competence of the courts: their role is to protect against incursions on fundamental
values, not to second guess policy decisions.
76 Andrews, ibid. at 151-53; and see also Turpin v.R, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 at 1330-35.
7 7 PublicAuthories ProtectionAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 406, s. 11(1).
78 Muhadkzadeh v. Ontario (1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 422 at 427 [hereinafterMizhadizadeh].
79 MWhadzad ibid. at 426-27. See also Brochner v. MacDonald, [1989] 6 W.W.R. 257 (Alta.
CA.). Here, the plaintiff, who was barred by a limitation period for medical negligence and
malpractice, was not found to be in a group analogous to groups listed in s. 15(1) of the Charter. In
Agnew et aL v.Dow Chemical et aL (1991), 116 N.B.R. (2d) 1 at 15, Stratton CJ.N.B., dissenting on
other grounds, held that a two-year limitation period for fatal injuries does not violate s. 15 because
it "does not differentiate between these claimants and other claimants based on a personal
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Similarly, in Filp v. Waterloo (City of),8 0 the Ontario Court of Appeal
reversed Colangelo and held that the absolute bar for those who do not
give a municipality notice of snow and ice claims within seven days did
not violate s. 15 of the Charter because "individuals injured as a result of
snow and ice on municipal sidewalks are a disparate and heterogenous
group, not a discrete and insular minority." The fact that a group
disadvantaged by a law was "disparate and heterogenous" would, under
public choice, indicate its vulnerability in the political process rather
than a justification for not finding a s. 15 violation. In these cases,
Canadian courts have implicitly rejected the justification for judicial
review suggested by public choice theory.
The Andrews approach has been criticized for narrowing the
ambit of equality rights,8' but in my view, it is true to the purposes of the
provision in protecting disadvantaged or vulnerable minorities. Critics
of Andrews would find support in public choice theory, but acceptance of
this support might weaken their case. It would reveal their deep
suspicion of the legislative process and their confidence that courts can,
and should, scrutinize the purposes and reasonableness of all legislation
which makes legal distinctions8 2
Even under s. 7 of the Charter, the courts have been deferential
to legislative determinations when reviewing short limitations. British
Columbia's special ultimate limitation period, requiring that malpractice
actions against doctors and hospitals be brought within six years of the
negligence regardless of discoverability, has been unsuccessfully
characteristic analogous to those of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability."
80 (1992), 98 D .R. (4th) 534 at 539 (Ont. CA.) [hereinafterFilip].
81 D. Gibson, "Equality for Some" (1991) 40 U..3LBJ. 2; and A. Bayefsky, "Case Comment"
(1990) 1 Supreme Court L.R. (2d) 503. But, see W. Black & L Smith, "Case Comment" (1989) 68
Can. Bar Rev. 591; and P.W. Hogg, "Interpreting the Charter of Rights: Generosity and
Justification" (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.T. 817 at 836-37.
82 This is not to say that theAndrews approach immunizes all statutes of limitations from s. 15
review. A short limitation may have adverse effects on those protected on enumerated and
analogous grounds, even though it would not be suspect on public choice grounds as legislation
designed to help an organized interest or legislation that is arbitrary to legitimate governmental
ends.
In Speerin v. North Bay (City) (1991), 85 D.LR. (4th) 365 (Ont. Gen. Div.), a seven-day notice
period was held to be of no force or effect, to the extent that it disadvantaged those unable to give
notice by reason of physical disability, an enumerated ground. A similar claim was rejected inFihip,
supra note 80 at 540, but only on the ground that the plaintiff was not disabled from giving notice.
However, in Murphy v. Welsh; Stoddard v. Watson (1991), 81 D.L.R.(4th) 475 at 483, rev'd on other
grounds (1993), 156 N.R. 263 (S.C.C.), the Ontario Court of Appeal formalistically concluded that a
two-year limitation period for highway traffic accidents did not discriminate against those under
eighteen years of age because the law was "not directed at the personal characteristics of infants but
rather at circumstances or events, namely motor vehicle accidents causing injury to infants."
1993]
OSGO ODE HALL LAW JOUPNAL
challenged as infringing the right to security of the person in a manner
not in accordance with fundamental justice. The British Columbia
Court of Appeal concluded that
time limits upon the recovery of damages are not matters which affect the dignity and
worth of the human person but are matters which properly lie within the realm of general
public policy, with the legislation responding to the conflicting interests of prospective
litigants and balancing those matters in a manner it considers appropriate. 83
Faced in this case with a limitation period that has been criticized as
protecting special interests and compelling facts of a plaintiff who was,
quite reasonably, unable to bring an action within the time provided, the
Court of Appeal nevertheless resisted the temptation to engage in a
constitutional review of short limitations.
It does not appear likely that Canadian courts will invalidate
short limitations on constitutional grounds. In part, they have declined
to do so for reasons of institutional competence. In Colangelo, Morden
J.A. noted that Ontario's special limitation periods had been criticized,
but concluded that reform "is truly a policy-based legislative function. It
could only be performed sporadically and crudely by constitutional
adjudication."' 4 Moreover, Canadian courts have committed themselves
sinceAndrews to an anti-majoritarian form of judicial review that focuses
on the protection of groups which are vulnerable to prejudice and
discrimination, and not all the diffuse and unorganized groups that
public choice suggests are vulnerable in the legislative process. If
anything, public choice would suggest that some of the groups protected
under s. 15 would, because of their discreteness and organizational base,
be advantaged in the legislative process.
B. Statutory Interpretation
Constitutional interpretation is, of course, the most drastic form
of judicial intervention. Although a court may not be prepared to strike
down a special limitation period on constitutional grounds, thus
precluding the legislature from enacting such a limitation, it may more
easily allow its attitudes towards the legislation influence its
interpretation of the statute. Statutory interpretation would only assign
to one of the parties the benefit of legislative inertia. The losing party
83 Wttman v. Emmolt (1991), 77 D.L.1. (4th) 77 at 92 [hereinafter Wittman]. See also Fillp,
supra note 80 at 537-38.
84 Colangelo, supra note 65 at 41. See also Filip, ibiL at 540.
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could always, in theory at least, obtain statutory amendments to displace
the court's ruling.
Because they attempt to impose harsher limitation periods on a
subset of disputes, short limitations produce many interpretative
opportunities. Defendants argue for a wide imposition of short
limitation periods and often appeal to the principle of generous
interpretation of statutes in order to fulfil their purposes. Plaintiffs seek
to narrow the ambit of short limitation periods and often ask courts to
construe short limitation periods strictly and to read them subject to
discoverability principles which are not derived from the statute itself.
Through the lens of public choice theory, the courts must choose
whether to protect plaintiffs who are diffuse and unorganized and thus
disadvantaged in the legislative process, or to assist defendants who are
well organized and already have obtained a short limitation.
Commentators have used the insights of public choice theory to
advocate a somewhat surprising variety of approaches to statutory
interpretation, 5 Some, such as Judges Easterbrook and Scalia, have
taken public choice insights to justify a textual form of statutory
interpretation on the grounds that the judiciary should enforce only what
was clearly enacted.8 6 Interest groups should get what they clearly
bargained for and no more. Judges should not pay much attention to
legislative history or professed legislative purposes because statutes are
bargains, not coherent instruments of public policy. Such an approach is
also consistent with applying a doctrine of strict construction to laws so
that whenever a judge perceives an ambiguity in the text, he or she can
read it down to derogate as little as possible from the common law or
other baseline rights. In the limitations context, short limitations would
be strictly construed because they derogate from the rights plaintiffs
would have under ordinary statutes of limitations.
Other commentators have used public choice to advocate a more
activist and creative form of statutory interpretation. They argue that
judges should not aim to enforce legislative deals but, rather, to interpret
legislation to advance public goods8 7 that may have been discounted in
85 .L Mashaw, "The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law" (1989) 65
Chi-Kent L Rev. 123.
8 6 Landes & Posner, supra note 32; F.H. Easterbrook, "Statutes Domain" (1983) 50 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 532; and F.H. Easterbrook, "Foreword: The Court and the Economic System" (1984) 98 Harv.
L. Rev. 4 at 49-51. See generally, W.N. Eskridge, Jr., "'The New Textualism" (1990) 37 U.C.LA.
Law R. 621; Farber & Frickey, supra note 2.
87 J.L Macey, "Promoting Public Regarding Legislation through Statutory Interpretation: An
Interest Group Model" (1986) 86 Colum. L Rev. 223. If the legislation is truly designed to benefit
interest groups, it may not have a genuine public purpose and one will have to be imputed. See J.M.
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the legislative process. Thus, courts would interpret statutes so as to
protect diffuse interests that may not have been well represented in the
legislative process.88 In the limitations context, courts could interpret
statutes of limitations subject to discoverability principles in order to
protect plaintiffs suffering from latent injuries who, as a diffuse and
unorganized group, are not likely to be protected in the legislative
process.
Both of these approaches to statutory interpretation have their
problems. The textual approach stands in tension with modern
techniques of statutory interpretation designed to give statutes a
remedial or purposive interpretation. 89 A literal approach that looks
only to the text of a statute "risks normative chaos by not requiring that
state actions be based on reasons" 90 or statutory purposes. On the other
hand, an activist approach to statutory interpretation runs the risk of
discounting both legislative language and purposes, and authorizing
judicial activism of a "swashbuckling variety." 91 Courts have been
attracted to both the textual and activist approaches to statutory
interpretation when interpreting short limitation periods. The Supreme
Court of Canada has, on the one hand, authorized courts to read short
limitation periods strictly and, on the other, has more actively imposed
pro-plaintiff discoverability principles. The techniques of statutory
interpretation have differed, but the results have been the same:
limitation periods have been interpreted in a manner favourable to
plaintiffs and adverse to defendants who have already secured short
limitation periods.
In Berardinelli v. Ontario Housing Corporation,92 the Supreme
Court decided that a short six-month limitation in s. 11 of the Public
Authorities Protection Act that applies to acts done in the execution of
"any statutory or other public duty or authority" did not apply to the
failure of a public housing corporation to keep its common areas cleared
of ice. In the result, the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of the
Beermann, "Interest Group Politics and Judicial Behavior. Macey's Public Choice" (1991) 67 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 183.
88 W.N. Eskridge, "Dynamic Statutory Interpretation" (1987) 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479; and
Farber & Frickey, supra note 2 at 141-43.
89 See, for example, InterpretationAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-21, s. 12, which provides that "[e]very
enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and
interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects."
9 0 J.. Ferejohn & B.R. Weingast, "Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation"
(1992) 80 Geo. L J. 565 at 572.
91 Mashaw, supra note 85 at 153.
92 Supra note 5 [hereinafterBerardineil.
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regular six-year limitation period for negligence actions under Ontario
law. Estey J. applied a doctrine of strict construction to short limitation
periods, stating:
[s]ection 11, being a restrictive provision wherein the rights of action of the citizen are
necessarily circumscribed by its terms, attracts a strict interpretation and any ambiguity
found upon the application of the proper principles of statutory interpretation should be
resolved in favour of the person whose right of action is being truncated. 9 3
Estey J. expressed a reluctance to "create different conditions of owner
liability for ... similar housing facilities" or to "reduce the right of
recovery of members of the public who suffer loss or injury."94 Such an
interpretative approach resembles the Streng case, discussed above, in its
antagonism to special distinctions and its desire to preserve the normal
rights that citizens enjoy to bring civil claims. This approach is also
consistent with public choice premises in its distrust of legislation that
protects special interests and its insistence that where possible, the rights
of diffuse members of the public be preserved by judicial action. Taken
to its extreme, a doctrine of strict construction would discount legislative
purposes and stress the preservation of pre-existing rights except where
judges believed words clearly derogate from them.
As discussed above, the textual approach to statutory
interpretation stands in tension to modem purposive approaches. It is
not surprising then that Berardinelli was ambiguous about its reliance on
strict construction. Estey J. also attempted to justify the result by
interpreting the short limitation period in a purposive manner. He
reasoned that the short limitation period was designed to protect public
authorities and thus should only limit their exposure to liability for their
public functions. The snow clearing function of the public housing
corporation did not have a "direct public purpose," but rather was an
activity of "an internal or operational nature having a predominantly
private aspect."95 This form of analysis is more congruent with those
theorists who have not abandoned purposive interpretation, but have
insisted that public choice justifies the court in pushing legislation in the
93 1bid at 280.
9 4 1bidL at 284. Similarly, in Stoddard, supra note 39 at 1080-81, the Supreme Court of Canada
interpreted a short two-year limitation period formotorvehicle accidents in the Highway TrafficAct,
R.S.O. 1980, c. 198, s. 180(1) as subject to general legislation that delays time from running until a
plaintiff reaches the age of eighteen. See Limitation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 240, a. 47. Major . stated
that "It]he s. 180(1) limitation period truncates liability" and concluded that "whatever interest a
defendant may have in the universal application of the two-year motor vehicle limitation period
must be balanced against the concerns of fairness to the plaintiff under legal disability."
95Berardinell4 supra note 5 at 286 and 284.
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direction of a public purpose that may have been discounted in the
legislative process.
Attempts at purposive construction rather than reliance on strict
construction have dominated subsequent cases interpreting the six-
month limitation in the Public Authorities Protection Act. This has led to
a significant number of cases in which courts have attempted, without
success or consistency,96 to decide whether particular governmental
activities have a predominantly public or private character. It is not
difficult to imagine that the jurisprudence would be clearer if the courts
had eschewed attempts to give the short limitation a legitimate purpose
and had simply interpreted it strictly, giving plaintiffs the benefit of any
reasonable ambiguity. The short limitation would not have been
invalidated, as was urged in Mirhadizadeh, but the courts would require a
clear statement that claims were covered by it. In cases of ambiguity,
they would assign the benefit of legislative inertia to plaintiffs who might
not be as well represented in the legislative process as the defendant
public authorities.
In contrast to their equivocal endorsement of strict construction,
the Supreme Court has successfully encouraged courts to interpret
statutes of limitations subject to discoverability principles. Starting with
Kamloops v. Neilson,97 theCourt has interpreted limitation periods as
subject to when a reasonable person would have discovered the cause of
action. In explaining her decision in Kamloops, Justice Wilson has
commented on the ambiguity of much statutory language and the policy
space that this presents to judges:
[i]n my view, the bare bones phrase, "when the cause of action accrues" discloses little
about whether the relevant factor in accrual is the negligent act itself, the damage, or the
discoverability of the tortious injury. The choice among the possibilities cannot be made
in a policy vacuum that does not take account of the various contemporary contexts in
which limitation periods must operate. 98
96 For example, the Act has been held to cover claims where the plaintiff fell on a school's
steps, but not for a fall on ice in a school yard. Compare Danis v. Roman Catholic Separate School
Board of Nipissing (1985), 49 O.R. (2d) 786, affd 61 O.R. (2d) 319 (CA.) with U-zr v. Board of
Education of North York (1980), 30 O.R. (2d) 300 (H.CJ.). Likewise, theAct has been held to cover
an action against a school board for constructive dismissal, but not an action for wrongful dismissal
against Ontario Hydro. Compare Re Gallant & Roman Catholic Separate School Board of Sudbuy
(1985), 56 O.R. (2d) 160 (CA.) with Hanna v. Ontario Hydro (1982), 18 B.L.R. 93 (Ont. ILC.). See
generally, A. Herschorn, "Limitation Periods in Ontario" (1988) 9 Advocates' Q. 287 at 299-300;
Mew, supra note 11 at 234-37.
9 7 Supra note 4 [hereinafterKamloops].
98 B. Wilson, "Law and Policy in a Court of Last Resort" in F.E. McArdle, ed., The Cambridge
Leures: 1989 (Montreal: Yvon Blais, 1990) at 232.
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Justice Wilson has suggested that the Court's decision was one of policy
to prevent injustice to plaintiffs and was not dictated by statutory
language or purposes.
Kamloops fits within an activist approach to statutory
interpretation because the court chose to impose pro-plaintiff values
that were not found in either the text or purpose of the statute of
limitations. The Supreme Court has in fact been criticized for usurping
the legislative role in reforming limitation periods.9 Presumably critics
of Kamloops would require the Court to wait for legislative reform of
limitations. I think that Kamloops was a justified form of judicial
activism for two reasons. First, the Court wanted to avoid "the injustice
of a rule which statute-bars a claim before a plaintiff was even aware of
its existence."100  This was considered more important than the
defendant's interest in repose, certainty, and having claims based on
fresh evidence. Second, the Court's activism favoured the interests of a
diffuse and unorganized group-plaintiffs who suffer latent
injuries-over those of defendants. Remember that the defendant
municipality in Kamloops had already obtained a benefit from the
legislature, namely a one-year limitation under the MunicipalActj10 In
imposing discoverability principles, the Court assigned the burden of
overcoming legislative inertia on the defendant municipality which, in
this case, had already obtained a short limitation and could presumably
lobby the legislature for an ultimate limitation period that would apply
regardless of discoverability.
Although Berardinelli and Kamloops employ different
approaches to statutory interpretation, in both cases the Court
interpreted the limitation to preserve the plaintiff's right to sue. In both
cases, the Court stressed that it interpreted the limitation in order to
treat the plaintiff fairly. This is the most compelling justification for
their decisions. Nevertheless, the Court could also have supported its
decision on the basis that the plaintiffs in these particular cases were
likely to be vulnerable in the legislative process, especially when
compared to the defendant public bodies who had already secured a
short limitation.
Judicial application of discoverability principles or strict
construction of short limitation periods have mitigated some of the
99 J. Blom, "Case Comment" (1987) 21 U.B.CL. Rev. 429 at 445-47.
1 00 Kamloops, supra note 4 at 40.
101 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 255, s. 738(2), albeit an advantage that was repealed in the 1975 reforms
and replaced with a standard two-year period. LimitationsAct, S.B.C. 1975, c. 37, & 3.
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effects of short limitation periods, but such techniques have limits. For
example, the doctrine of strict construction only applies to what a judge
perceives to be reasonable ambiguities in statutory language. In Suche v.
The Queen,1 02 a plaintiff attempted to avoid a seven-day notice provision
for injuries "caused by snow and ice" by arguing that her injury, a slip
and fall on airport property in Calgary in January, was not caused by
snow or ice, but rather a combination of ice and water! Although willing
to read the short notice provision strictly and give the plaintiff the
benefit of a reasonable doubt,103 McNair J. quite reasonably dismissed
the absurdly literal interpretation proposed by the plaintiff as "a play on
words." 104 Strict construction can be useful in resolving cases of
reasonable ambiguities, but courts will not use it to ignore what they
perceive to be clear statutory words or purposes.
Likewise, courts have been unwilling to apply discoverability
principles in the face of clear legislative words and purposes to the
contrary. In one case, a plaintiff urged the courts to apply discoverability
principles to s. 8(1) of British Columbia's Limitation Act which states
that no medical malpractice action shall be brought "after the expiration
of six years from the date on which the right to do so arose."105 The
Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiff's argument "that the
discoverability rule applies to every limitation period, as a matter of
policy, regardless of the language of the particular statute involved"
1°6
and held that the six-year ultimate limitation period had expired even
though the injury was not discoverable for the first four years after the
negligence occurred. The Court of Appeal held that interpreting the
words "right to bring an action" subject to discoverability principles
would give them "a meaning alien to that by which they have been
traditionally understood"10 7 and, more importantly, would subvert what
was in their view
102 Supra note 73.
103 McNair 3. stated. "[ilf there were another construction that would lead to a more
reasonable result from the standpoint of the plaintiff and avoid the perpetuation of what is said to
be a manifest injustice then I would unhesitatingly choose to follow it. However, I see no alternative
avenue of construction that would enable me to accomplish that end." Ibid at 480-81.
1 0 41bid. at 479.
105 LimitationAct, supra note 14.
106 Wttnan, supra note 83 at 83.
10 71bid. at 85-86. The Ontario Court of Appeal reached a similar result in interpreting a two-
year limitation period, running from the date of treatment in s. 28 of the Public Hospitals.Act,
R.S.O. 1980, c. 410 in Von Cramm v. Riverside Hospital of Ottawa (1986), 56 O.R. (2d) 700 at 703,
stating that "[t]he wording is precise and there is no valid ground for avoiding it."
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a considered response to what the legislature considered to be the excessive exposure of
the profession to delayed medical malpractice actions.... Accordingly, I do not consider it
appropriate to apply a "general rule" of interpretation which is so apparently in conflict
with the language of the statute and with the specifically expressed intention of the
legislature to balance the interests of claimants and the medical profession. 1 0 8
The Court went on to state:
[ilt is for the Legislature to decide what balance should be struck between those
competing interests. The fact that it has accorded special treatment to two classes of
potential defendants does not justify the Court in disturbing one of the basic premises of
the Act.1 09
Although courts can interpret short limitations strictly and subject to
discoverability principles, they are not likely to ignore unambiguous
wording and legislative purposes. In the next section, I will suggest that
this balance is the appropriate one because public choice does not have
the normative content necessary to justify the nullification of legislation.
Those influenced by public choice may look to the courts as the
antidote to the dominance of organized interests in the legislative
process, but Canadian courts are not likely to fill this role. Courts may
read down short limitation periods within the limits set by reasonable
ambiguities but, even after Berardinelli, this technique has not won wide
acceptance among a judiciary more inclined to interpret statutes in a
purposive manner. Since Kamloops, the courts have accepted as a
matter of policy that limitation periods should be interpreted to allow
plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to discover they have a cause of
action. Nevertheless, this policy disposition operates at a sub-
constitutional level and courts will defer to clear legislative purposes and
language which set the limitation running from a specific time. At the
constitutional level, courts have not undertaken the searching review of
the purposes and rationality of legislation that public choice invites
because of a desire to defer to the legislative process and concerns about
their own competence. Moreover, they have committed themselves to
an anti-majoritarian form of judicial review which does not protect the
unorganized groups that public choice predicts will be vulnerable in the
legislative process.
108 Wtan, supra note 83 at 85-86.
109/bI& at 86, quoting Esson J.A. in Bera v. Man- (1986), 27 D.L. (4th) 161 at 187.
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V. LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF SHORT LIMITATION PERIODS
If courts are not likely to engage in wholesale reform of short
limitation periods, what about the legislature itself? Taken on its own
terms, public choice would be very pessimistic about the reform of short
limitations. Most potential plaintiffs who are harmed by short
limitations will have difficulty organizing to lobby for legislative reform.
The chance that someone will be harmed by a short limitation is too
remote to justify bearing the costs of lobbying for reform. Even if the
interests of plaintiffs could be represented by an organized group such as
personal injury lawyers, or insurers, well-organized defendant groups
such as the medical profession would be in a good position to block
legislative reform. In any event, governments would not be eager to
engage in reform of limitation statutes because such an activity does not
deliver a visible and concentrated benefit to any one group of voters.110
Such a pessimistic account of the legislative process cannot
explain significant examples of reform of short limitations. In England,
many special limitations were repealed as part of comprehensive reform
providing a general three-year limitation period for negligence actions111
and when the courts refused to impose discoverability principles,
Parliament introduced legislation allowing plaintiffs to recover for latent
damages.112 British Columbia eliminated most of its short limitations in
1975; and Bill 99113 in Ontario proposes to repeal thirty-two special
limitation periods, including the one-year limitation for medical
malpractice suits, the three-month limitation for road claims against
municipalities, and the six-month limitation under the Public Authorities
Protection Act. Both the British Columbia and Ontario reforms were
inspired by the work of law reform commissions and carried out by the
Attorney General through the legislative process. Law reform
commissions have the potential to speak for interests that may not be
well represented in the legislative process. Through publicity and
criticism, they can raise the costs to interest groups and governments of
11 0 The author of a legal text on limitations has explained the lack of reform in the following
terms: "[l]egislative overhaul of limitation statutes is not a big votespinner and special interest
groups who stand to lose in such an overhaul argue against law reform. As a result, legislative
review, normal in other areas, seldom occurs in respect of limitation statutes." Morton, supra note
11 at 3.
111 Law Reform (Limitation ofActions) Act 1954 (U.K.), 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 36, s. 1.
112 Latent DamageAct 1986 (U.K.), 1986, c. 75.
113 Bill 99, An Act to Revise the Limitations Act 1st reading, 3d Session, 35th Leg., Ontario,
(November 25 1992), cl. 25 [hereinafter Bill 99].
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retaining short limitation periods while reducing information costs for
dispersed plaintiff groups and their lawyers. Likewise, the power that an
Attorney General has to develop and implement reforms in the
Canadian parliamentary system can be contrasted with the reliance on
legislative committees in the American system. Before Canadians
consider importing public choice, they should consider whether
institutional differences between the Canadian and American political
systems make the Canadian system less susceptible to capture by
organized interests and more able to advance the public interest.
In addition to comprehensive reform, there has been important
piecemeal reform of short limitations. Manitoba and Alberta repealed
some short limitations in the mid-1960s. 114 In the mid-1970s, the
Ontario legislature amended the limitation period governing health
professionals so that it no longer ran from the time services were
terminated, but was extended until a plaintiff reasonably could have
discovered the facts that justify an action. 115 In both Ontario and British
Columbia, the legislature imposed discoverabiity principles before the
courts, despite the fact that public choice would predict that plaintiffs
suffering latent injuries would not have much power in the legislative
process. Of course, it is possible to explain Ontario's acceptance of
discoverability principles in the medical malpractice context as a deal
that allowed health professionals to retain a short one-year limitation
while other negligence actions were governed by Ontario's traditional
six-year period. Such an explanation ignores the resistance of the
medical profession to the amendment which increased their exposure to
liability for latent injuries.116 Moreover, it reduces public choice's
explanation of reform to a non-falsifiable tautology, based on an
assumption that any reform simply illustrates a calculation by the
relevant interest group of where its interest really lies.
Despite these examples of successful reform, some recent
developments suggest that limitation reforms remain vulnerable to
interest group lobbying. Following the recommendations of their law
reform commission, British Columbia abolished many short limitations
114 Limitations of Actions Amendment Act, S.M. 1967, c. 32, s. 5. Limitations of Actions
Amendment Act, SA. 1966, c. 49, s. 4. In 1975, Ontario amended a one-year limitation for damages
by motor vehicles to two years. Highway Traffic AmendmentAc 1975 (No.2), S.O. 1975, c. 37, s. 1.
In 1983, Newfoundland's DentalAc4 S.N. 1983, c. 26, s. 32, was amended to change the limitation for
malpractice claims from one to two years. In 1990, P.E.I.'s Engineering Profession Ac4 S.P.E.I. 1990,
c. 12, s. 24, was amended to change the limitation from one year to two years.
115 Health Disc plineAct, S.O. 1974, c. 47, s. 17.
116 Prichard, Appendix A, supra note 48 at 193.
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in 1975 including the one-year limitation on medical malpractice suits.
Both the law reform commission and the 1975 bill prepared by the
Attorney General proposed a thirty-year ultimate limitation period to
recognize the value of repose. After first reading, however, a special
ten-year ultimate limitation period for malpractice claims against
doctors and hospitals was proposed as an amendment and accepted. To
confirm any doubt about the ability of doctors to obtain special benefits
from the legislature, two years later the legislature lowered the special
short ten-year ultimate limitation on malpractice claims to six years.117
The Law Reform Commission of British Columbia has recently
recommended the repeal of this short six-year ultimate limitation period,
concluding that limitations "related to the occupation of the defendant
are invidious."118
Ontario's Bill 99 also contains some special ultimate limitation
periods which can be criticized from a public choice perspective. A ten-
year ultimate period is contemplated for proceedings against health
facilities, health practitioners, and contractual improvements to real
property.119 A public choice theorist would conclude that these
provisions are the result of the lobbying power of organized groups such
as doctors, hospitals, and the home improvement industry, all of whom
were, in fact, represented in the consultation group that approved
Ontario's proposals. 20 Having found special interests present at their
creation, it would be a short step to denounce these provisions as special
interest legislation which unfairly redistributes wealth from dispersed
groups of plaintiffs (patients and homeowners) to well-organized and
well-connected groups of defendants.
Such conclusions may be attractive in this age of cynicism about
politics, but they may not be warranted. Even if Ontario's current one-
year malpractice limitation and its proposed ten-year ultimate
malpractice limitation were both the product of an organized medical
117 Miscellaneous StatutesAmendnentAc4 1977, S.B.C. 1977, c. 76, s. 19.
118 But they did recommend that all claims be governed by a ten-year ultimate limitation
period, B.C. Repor supra note 51 at 49. The Prichard Committee has also recommended that
malpractice claims be governed by a ten-year ultimate limitation period which runs from the date
services are rendered. Prichard, supra note 46.
119 Bill 99, supra note 113, cls. 15(3), (4), and (6). Clause 15(5), however, states that the ten-
year ultimate limitation periods for doctors and hospitals "do not apply if the claim is based on the
leaving of a foreign object having no therapeutic or diagnostic purpose in the body of the person
with the claim."
120 Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, Recommendations for a New Limitations Act.
Report of the Limitations Act Consultation Group (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General,
March 1991).
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lobby, there are important differences between the effects of these two
pieces of legislation. The one-year period may overshoot any legitimate
purpose of limitation periods and preclude a significant portion of
claims, while the ten-year period may preclude far fewer claims and be
justified by the repose function of limitation periods. Public choice
analysis is insufficiently qualitative to evaluate law reform. Moreover, it
does not allow for the possibility that some special interest legislation
may serve the public interest. The ten-year ultimate malpractice
limitation has been supported by two independent bodies, the Law
Reform Commission of British Columbia and the Prichard
Interprovincial Committee on Health Care, which both expressed
concerns about the costs of record keeping and insurance being passed
on to patients 21 One could argue that these bodies were captured by
the medical groups they consulted, or more charitably, made prudent
judgment of political feasibility given the lobbying strength of doctors.
Nevertheless, in an age of rising health care costs and diminishing
taxation revenues, their recommendations cannot be dismissed out of
hand as special interest pleading. My point is simply that public choice
analysis does not prove that what it identifies as special interest
legislation is necessarily harmful to the public.
To determine whether a particular limitation was harmful to the
public requires an empirical assessment of the relative costs of shorter
and longer limitation periods and, most importantly, an explicit
normative framework for placing values on the costs imposed on
defendants, plaintiffs, and the public. Public choice invites the
assessment of these relative costs but, as has been suggested, this task
becomes extremely difficult if non-material values and the possibility of
error is considered. Public choice does not, however, provide any
normative framework for assigning values to these costs.P2 Without the
necessary data and explicit normative framework, one cannot conclude
that what public choice analysis identifies as special interest legislation is
harmful or beneficial to the public. The failure of public choice to justify
normative conclusions can be illustrated by two examples where it is
arguable that special limitation periods serve the public interest.
121 B.C. Repor supra note 51; Prichard, supra note 46 at 21.
12 2 It might be thought that public choice invites a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis, but such a
calculus is highly controversial and ignores questions of distribution. Other normative frameworks,
such as Pareto efficiency or corrective justice, would attach more weight to the costs borne by
plaintiffs who have their claims precluded by limitation periods. See generally, MJ. Trebilcock,
"Economic Analysis of Law" in R1F. Devlin, ed., Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theorjy (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery, 1991) at 103.
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Most provinces have special short limitations governing
defamation claims against newspapers and other media. They usually
provide a short notice period of up to two weeks and require that actions
be commenced between three to six months after publication.1 23 Public
choice would stress that these provisions demonstrate the lobbying
power of Canada's concentrated media industry. On the other hand, it
can plausibly be argued that they also serve the public interest. By
forcing plaintiffs to bring suits early, these short limitations may limit
attempts to influence press activities with threats of civil actions. This
may help promote freedom of the press and mitigate the effects of libel
chill. Again, an ultimate determination of whether these special
limitations are justified would require an empirical examination of the
frequency, nature, and effects of defamation actions and, most
importantly, a normative framework to weigh and balance the costs to
plaintiffs, defendants, and the public. Public choice provides no such
framework.
My point is not that short limitation periods to protect doctors
and the media are necessarily justified, but that public choice can only
analyze the genesis of legislation. At best, it provides grounds to be
suspicious of legislation that protects well-organized groups. Public
choice must be supplemented by some form of overt normative analysis.
As E.R. Elhauge has concluded, public choice analysis by itself "cannot
generate any normative conclusions about whether the group's influence
was disproportionate to the influence it should have had" and "unless
the underlying normative issues are recognized, interest group theory
threatens to obscure rather than illuminate the debate." 124
A final example that illustrates the limitations and dangers of
public choice are provisions enacted in British Columbia, P.E.I., and
Saskatchewan, and contained in Ontario's Bill 99 that would eliminate
limitation periods for civil claims based on childhood sexual abuse.1 25
These proposals could be seen as special interest legislation which
reflects the lobbying strength of advocacy groups for women and the
disabled, two groups of potential plaintiffs disadvantaged by the present
state of limitations law. Having related these provisions to the lobbying
123 See, for example, the legislation cited supra note 16.
124 "Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?" (1991) 101 Yale L
J. 31 at 51-52. See also Farber & Frickey, supra note 2 at 9.
125 Limitation AmendmentAc4 S.B.C. 1992, c. 44; An Act to Amend the Statute of Limitations,
S.P.E.L 1992, c. 63, s. 1; Limitation of Actions Amendment Ac4 1993, S.S. 1993, c. 9, s. 2; Bill 99,
supra note 113, cL 16(h).
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efforts of these groups, these provisions could then be branded as
"special interest" legislation.
Such an approach has several problems. Accepting public choice
premises for the sake of argument, it is not clear if women and the
disabled are among those who, because of pre-existing organizational
structures will have an advantage in the legislative process, or if they are
dispersed groups who are vulnerable in the legislative process.
Proponents of the former proposition would stress that these
groups are already organized in advocacy groups, some of which receive
public funding, and that they have been able in the past to secure
legislation for their benefit. Proponents of the latter proposition would
stress the diffuse nature of these groups and the barriers they face to
political participation. Bruce Ackerman has identified women as a
group who are vulnerable in the political process because they are
dispersed 26 and some judges have undertaken the task of interpreting
limitations to allow claims from survivors of sexual abuse on the
assumption that survivors "are not organized as a political force and ...
cannot produce legislative solutions to their problems."127 Nevertheless,
it is not clear on a public choice analysis whether women and the
disabled would be identified as groups capable of exerting a
disproportionate lobbying interest or whether they are diffuse and
unorganized and hence, vulnerable in the legislative process. As Jerry
Mashaw has said about public choice, "'positive theory' at this level of
generality is indistinguishable from ideology." 128
Even if the proposed sexual abuse provisions were related to the
lobbying strength of organized groups, this hardly answers the question
of whether they are justified.1 29 Such a conclusion would require an
explicit normative framework to judge the value of allowing civil claims
of childhood sexual abuse against the values served by limitation
12 6 Supra note 56.
127 Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226 at 237 (Wash. 1986) per Utter . in dissent. In Canada, the
Supreme Court has held that there is a presumption that a plaintiff should not have discovered
childhood incest until she receives therapy (M.(), supra note 4).
12 8 Supra note 85 at 155.
129 See, for example, D.A- Farber & P.P. Frickey, "Is Carotene Products Dead? Reflections on
Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation" (1991) 79 Calif. L. Rev. 685.
Even if civil rights legislation reflects lobbying strength of concentrated and organized minority
groups, it may be justified to overcome non-rational behaviour of the majority, such as prejudice.
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periodsP Such normative analysis would consider many factors, such
as the effects of sexual abuse on its victims and the history of ignoring
this problem, that are simply not relevant under a public choice
analysis.131 My concern is that public choice analysis could be given a
normative weight that it has not earned. By its focus on the lobbying
efforts of organized groups, public choice could be used to discredit the
gains of all such groups, even if there are good reasons why the
legislature should promote their interests.
By declaring legislation to be the product of special interests,
public choice begs the normative question of whether that interest
should be valued. Given both its indeterminacy and its lack of explicit
normative analysis, public choice allows commentators to criticize
"special interest" legislation without explaining why they are opposed to
such legislation. A judiciary that employed public choice analysis could
invalidate or read down legislation it thought was the product of
organized interests without justifying the use of judicial power'3 2 Public
choice used in this conclusory fashion is, in my view, misleading and
dangerous because of its false claims to scientific precision and
normative neutrality.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In the context of short limitation periods, public choice has only
limited utility in predicting the behaviour of interest groups and
legislatures. Its analysis is plagued by a large degree of indeterminacy,
especially if the non-material benefits of legislation and the possibility
that interest groups will not act rationally are considered. When its
calculus is restricted to material incentives, its ability to explain the
empirical record is relatively modest. To be sure, some organized
130 See, for example, M.(K), supra note 4. For a persuasive argument that legislative reform
abolishing statute of limitations is still needed after the Supreme Court's decision in M.(K), see J.
Mosher, "Challenging Limitation Periods: Civil Claims by Adult Survivors of Incest" (1994) 44
U.TIJ. (forthcoming).
131 On the inability of law and economics to comprehend the problems of gender inequality,
see WA. Weigers, "Economic Analysis of Law and Trivate Ordering': A Feminist Critique" (1992)
42U.T.LJ. 170.
132 See, for example, Justice Scalia's public choice-inspired argument that white males not
promoted under affirmative action programmes are "predominantly unknown, unaffluent,
unorganized" and "politically impotent" (Johnson v. Transport Agency, 107 U.S. 1442 at 1475
(1987)). His argument makes the controversial empirical assumption that people who benefit from
such programmes are politically powerful, ignores their historical treatment, and begs the normative
question of whether such programmes are justified.
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groups have been able to obtain short limitations at the expense of
diffuse groups of plaintiffs, but the legislative process has by no means
always disregarded the interests of diffuse groups of plaintiffs, or always
advanced the interests of concentrated groups of defendants. Reform of
short limitations is possible and law reform commissions and Attorneys'
General departments can play an important role by representing diffuse
and unorganized interests.
Canadian courts are not likely to correct the deficiencies that
public choice has claimed to exist in the legislative process by exercising
their powers of constitutional review. Some American courts have been
attracted to constitutional invalidation of short limitation periods on the
grounds that they unfairly benefit organized groups of defendants, but
this sort of judicial review quickly requires courts to approach all
legislative distinctions with the hostility that characterized the Lochner
era. In their landmarkAndrews decision, the Supreme Court of Canada
has implicitly rejected using constitutional adjudication to protect the
diffuse and unorganized groups that public choice suggests will be
vulnerable in the legislative process. In my view, public choice has
rightly been rejected as a justification for constitutional review. It would
require the courts to assess the purposes and reasonableness of all legal
distinctions and it would deny that the ultimate purpose of judicial
review, and equality rights in particular, is to protect disadvantaged
minorities, not diffuse groups who may be harmed by an isolated piece
of legislation. Public choice can facilitate a counterattack on legislation
designed to ameliorate the conditions of the disadvantaged. It does so,
not by engaging the merits of such measures, but by simply denouncing
them as special interest legislation.
On the other hand, I am less certain that public choice should be
rejected as a guide to statutory interpretation. In interpreting
limitations, Canadian courts have sided with plaintiffs by endorsing the
strict construction of short limitations and imposing discoverability
principles. The judiciary is in a good position to address some of the
obstacles that unorganized and diffuse groups of plaintiffs face in the
legislative process. Where there are reasonable ambiguities in short
limitations, courts should generally favour plaintiffs and assign the
burden of legislative inertia to well-organized defendant groups who
have already obtained short limitations. Even then, shortcomings in
public choice analysis suggest that courts should have an independent
normative reason, such as treating the plaintiff fairly, to justify their
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statutory interpretation. Should the legislature clearly state that a claim
is covered by a special limitation or displace discoverability principles,
public choice cannot justify the court overriding such a pronouncement,
because it does not prove that special interest legislation is necessarily
bad.
